Thursday, September 21, 2023

Marumakkathayam Law of Malabar

 Marumakkathayam Law of Malabar

The coral islands in the Arabian sea adjoining the Malabar coast, now known as Lakshadweep and earlier as Lakkadives, Minikoy and Amindivi islands, were parts of Malabar and South Canara Districts prior to the State re-organisation in 1956.

Though the name suggests that there are one hundred thousand islands, the archipelago consists of 37 islands of which 10 alone are inhabited.

The islands lie directly on the trade route between Africa, Arabia and Malabar. 

These islands therefore were a landmark for the navigators. 

Probably that was the reason why the group of islands was called Lakshadweep, 'Laksha' meaning a mark or a direction.

The earlier colonisers were perhaps Hindus who migrated from Malabar and particularly Kolathunadu, parts of present Cannanore District. 

The earlier inhabitants of Minikoy islands may be Singhalese.

Mr. R.H. Elly's I.C.S., who has prepared a short account of the Lakkadive islands and Minikoy is of the view that the islands supposed to have been peopled first are Amindivi, Kalpeni, Androth, Kavarathi and Agathi.

According to him the upper classes of the first four of these islands still claim to trace their descend from Nair or even Namboodiri families on the main land and these islands are known in consequence as tarwad islands in distinction to the other or Melacheri islands.

Sri N. Section Mannadiar who edited the Gazetteer of India on Lakshadweep observes that by no stretch of imagination could it be conceived that Namboodiris who were noted for their leisurely and pleasure seeking life had migrated to Lakshadweep.

There is every likelihood of those persons crossing the sea and inhabiting these islands. 

That appears to be the reason why many of the house names carry the word 'Illam'.

Mr. Ellis is of the opinion that the islanders under the influence of Arab traders were converted to Muhammadanism at sometime, probably in the 14th century.

Still the inhabitants of the island follow the maru-makkathayam system of inheritance which their forefathers had brought to the island at the time of migration.

On this aspect Sri Ellis says thus:

"The island law is a curious mixture of the ordinary Muhammadan Law with the Marumakkathayam Law of Malabar.

Property is regarded as either ancestral or self-acquired. 

Ancestral property is known as Velliaricha (literally Friday property), pronounced Belliaricha on the Amindivis.

Self acquired property is known as Tingalaricha (literally Monday property) on the Malabar islands and as Velliaricha on the South Kanara islands.

Velliyaricha properties (ancestral) are governed by the ordinary marumakhathayam law i.e. descend through sister's children and devolution on the descendants in the female line.

There is no codified law and the practices are governed by customs which differ from island to island. 

The tarwad properties can be partitioned only with the consent of all the members of the tarwad.

The editor further says that self-acquired or personal property is governed by Muhammadan law of succession. Here also there are variations in different islands.

In Androth island to which the parties to this suit belong succession to personal property is governed by marumakkathayam law unless it is specifically laid down in the Will of the deceased that it should go to his wife and children.

He further states that under the Muslim law followed in the islands the son is eligible for two shares in the property while the daughter gets only one share.

Mr. William Logan, Collector of Malabar District, in his Manual has stated that the inhabitants of Androth island compare favourably in physique with the people of the coast and in their customs and habits closely resemble the Mapillas of North Malabar.

He has no doubt mentioned about the complexities of the Muhammadan rules of inheritance and marriage and the existence side by side of the Makkatayam and Marumakkathayam rules which give rise to frequent litigation.

Anyway one thing is clear; Hindus and Mappillas of the Malabar and South Kanara coasts were the original inhabitants of the islands. 

They had carried with them their personal law. Muslims of North Malabar follow the marumakkathayam system of inheritance like Hindus.

That may be the reason why the original inhabitants followed that system even after conversion of the Hindus into Muhammadanism.

The division of tarwad properties can therefore be only in accordance with the marumakkathayam law as it stood before the Madras Marumakkathayam Act and the Aliyasanthana Act which were made applicable to the Malabar and South Kanara District of the erstwhile Madras Presidency.

W. E. Ormsby who had been the Chief Justice of the Travancore High Court in his book "Outlines of Marumakkathayam Law" says thus :

"Where division takes place it will usually be according to the Tai-varies or number of daughters of the original ancestress. Each Tai-vari may similarly be sub-divided should the members consent thereto, and so on until individual proprietorship is arrived at."

At page 719 of Raghavachariar's Hindu Law, 7th Edn. Vol. II. 

The learned author says that every member of the tarwad being equally interested in the property, any partition arrangement should not be on the stirpital but on the per capita basis.

The author gives an example of a tarwad (family) consisting of a brother and two sisters and the issue of the sisters. 

One sister has 9 children and the other has 14. According to the author the property has to be divided into 26 shares, one share being allotted to the brother, 10 shares to the tavazhi of the sister having 9 children and 15 shares to the tavazhi of the sister having 14 children.

The Madras High Court has relied on an article of Sundara Ayyar J. on Topics of Malabar Law which appeared in (1899) ILR 22 Mad 337. 

In that article the view propounded was that division is made not per stirpes but per capita.

**

Saturday, January 21, 2023

A somewhat curious case

Curious case
A somewhat curious case:

Plaintiff Venkatrama Aiyar was convicted of the murder of his wife and sentenced to transportation for life.

On the eve of departure for Port Blair he executed a deed of gift in favour of one Singam Aiyar, a relation of his. This was on 23-5-1900.

The deed of gift runs as follows:
"You, Singam Aiyar, should obtain possession of and enjoy the undermentioned moveable and immoveable properties with the rights of gift, sale etc. 

In case my sentence should terminate and I should come back to my village, you should hand over the said properties to me. 

If I should not return, you should get the undermentioned properties. You should discharge the debts due by me from my property and also collect the debts due to me."

Four years afterwards on 20-6-1904, Singam Aiyar sold certain of the immovable properties, (which are the subject matter of the present suit).

Singam Aiyar died subsequently. Plaintiff was released after serving 16 years and returned to his native place in October 1916.

He brings the present suit to recover possession of the property from the vendees (purchasers) of Singam Aiyar.

The District Munsif gave him a decree for possession and mesne profits. 

But the District Judge has set aside the decree and directed that the suit should be dismissed with costs. 

This Second Appeal was preferred in the Madras High Court.

The District Judge has decided against the plaintiff on two grounds, viz. One is limitation, and the second ground is that the obligation to surrender the properties is only a personal one against Singam Aiyar and his heirs, are not against the alienees (purchasers).

But this suit against the alienees alone without impleading Singam Aiyar's sons.

The question is whether the right to recover the property is personal, only to Singam Aiyar and possibly his sons will depend on the question of whether the defeasance clause is legal and enforceable.

Transfer of Property Act 
The relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are Sections 31 and 126.

Section 31 says:
 "On a transfer of property an interest therein, may be created with the condition super-added that it shall cease to exist in case a specified uncertain event shall happen, or in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen."
This is a general clause. 

But the specific clause having reference only to gifts is Section 126. 
This runs thus:
"The donor and donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event, which does not depend on the will of the donor, a gift shall be a suspended or revoked. 
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the rights of transferees for consideration without notice." 

The rights of transferees for consideration without notice should be safeguarded. 

This general rule appears to be in accordance with English Law, - Vide 24 Halsbury 170.

"An estate in fee may be granted with words of direct limitation so as to be prima facie a fee simple, but with further words, sometimes called words of collateral limitation whereby it is liable to be determined on the happening of some future event, provided that this is of such a nature that by possibility it may never happen all. 

An estate so limited is called a "determinable fee" and moreover it is no objection that the future event may happen at a time beyond the limit allowed by the rule against perpetuities."

HERE:
Whether the defendants are transferees for consideration without notice so as to be entitled to the benefit of the last paragraph of Section 126 is a point.

That point has not been determined by the District Judge and on which a finding will be necessary.

defeasance clause:
Whether a defeasance clause, such as the present, transgresses any rule of Hindu Law. 

Unlike English Law, Hindu Law treats all conditions of defeasance as illegal.

(defeasance = if a condition is fulfilled, that renders the deed null and void).

Lord Justice Turner said:
"A man cannot create a new form of estate or alter the line of succession allowed by law, for the purpose of carrying out his on wishes or views of policy."

In this case:
The property conveyed shall go to Singam Aiyar and pass to his heirs in the ordinary course of inheritance subject to the single contingency that, if the plaintiff returns it will go back to him and pass to him and pass to his heirs in the ordinary course of inheritance.

Ruling:
In our opinion, the clause providing that in the event of the plaintiff's return, all the properties shall revert to him is legal and enforceable, equally upon Singam Aiyar and upon Singam Aiyar's heirs.

Purchasers' position:
It only remains to determine whether the defendants are entitled to resist the suit as purchasers for consideration without notice. 

The District Judge found that the defendants are bona-fide purchasers for value without notice.

HC finding:
It is however clear to our mind that they are persons who purchased the property with notice of the defeasance clause in the original deed of gift granted by the plaintiff to Singam Aiyar. 

Result:
HC allowed the second appeal and set aside the District Judge's verdict and thereby confirmed the District Munsif's judgment passed in favour of the plaintiff.
**